The Political Cost of Lockdown's Enforcement

Andrea Fazio (), Tommaso Reggiani () and Fabio Sabatini

No 14032, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We study how the political cost of enforcing a lockdown in response to the COVID- 19 outbreak relates to citizens' propensity for altruistic punishment in Italy, the early epicenter of the pandemic. Approval for the government's management of the crisis decreases with the amount of the penalties that individuals would like to see enforced for lockdown violations. People supporting stronger punishment are more likely to consider the government's reaction to the pandemic as insufficient. However, after the establishment of tougher sanctions for risky behaviors, we observe a sudden flip in support for government. Higher amounts of the desired fines become associated with a higher probability of considering the government's policy response as too extreme, lower trust in government, and lower confidence in the truthfulness of the officially provided information. Lock-downs entail a political cost that helps explain why democracies may adopt epidemiologically suboptimal policies.

Keywords: COVID-19; lockdown; law enforcement; altruistic punishment; trust in institutions; incumbent support; Italy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D12 D83 I12 K40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2021-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eec, nep-law, nep-pol and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

Published - revised version published as 'The political cost of sanctions: evidence from COVID-19' in: Health Policy ,2022, 126 (9), 872-878

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Working Paper: The political cost of lockdown´s enforcement (2023)
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