Gender Discrimination and Common Property Resources
Marco Casari and
Maurizio Lisciandra ()
No 9601, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
Abstract:
In an open economy with common property resources at the community level, marriage and migratory decisions crucially depend on inheritance rules on the commons. Motivated by the traditional management of the commons in the Italian Alps, we present a model that fits the evolution of property rights observed over six centuries. Women's rights over the commons were progressively eroded from the Middle Ages until 1800, when there was an almost universal adoption of a patrilineal inheritance system. Communities switched from an egalitarian system to a patrilineal inheritance system in an attempt to protect the per capita endowment of common resources from outside immigration. The model shows that inheritance rules have clear-cut implications for marriage strategies, migratory flows, and fertility rates.
Keywords: inheritance; commons; migration; institutions; property rights (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J13 J16 Q24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2015-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env, nep-gro, nep-his and nep-mig
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://docs.iza.org/dp9601.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp9601
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Holger Hinte ().