Crime and Self-Control Revisited: Disentangling the Effect of Self-Control on Risk and Social Preferences

Tim Friehe and Hannah Schildberg-Hörisch ()
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Hannah Schildberg-Hörisch: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Hannah Schildberg-Hoerisch ()

No 8109, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: In economic models, risk and social preferences are major determinants of criminal behavior. In criminology, low self-control is considered a fundamental cause of crime. Relating the arguments from both disciplines, this paper studies the relationship between self-control and both risk and social preferences. To exogenously vary the level of self-control, we use a well-established experimental manipulation. We find that low self-control causes less risk-averse behavior. The effect of self-control on social preferences is not significant. In sum, our findings support the proposition that low self-control is a facilitator of crime. While our study is motivated by the literature on the determinants of criminal behavior, it has important implications for dual-system models and documents endogeneity of economic preferences.

Keywords: criminal behavior; risk preferences; social preferences; ego-depletion; dual-system models; experiment; endogeneity of economic preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 H23 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2014-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-law, nep-neu and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Published - published in: International Review of Law and Economics, 2017, 49, 23–32.

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Working Paper: Crime and Self-Control Revisited: Disentangling the Effect of Self-Control on Risk and Social Preferences (2014)
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