Strategic Use of Environmental Information
Geir Asheim
No 21/2009, Memorandum from Oslo University, Department of Economics
Abstract:
Strategic use of environmental information may have as consequence that a benevolent environmental agency will choose not to disclose information leading to reduced moral motivation. Thus, decision makers will not have access to such information, implying that they will not be able to adjust their decisions to available information on the state of the environment. In contrast, if the benevolent environmental agency instead bases its regulation on standard economic instruments, these instruments will incorporate all available information. Keywords and Phrases: Environmental regulation, voluntary contributions, moral motivation, hard information.
Keywords: environmental regulation; voluntary contributions; moral motivation; hard iformation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D11 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2009-09-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-env and nep-reg
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