King of the Hill: Positional Dynamics in Contests

No 06/2008, Memorandum from Oslo University, Department of Economics

Abstract: In a contest with positional dynamics between an incumbent and a challenger i) inequality of power may magnify conflicts, ii) more severe conflicts can go together with lower turnover of incumbents, and iii) power can be self defeating as cost advantages can reduce pay-offs. These three propositions of our paper are contrary to the implications of static conflict models. They follow from incorporating positional dynamics into the standard static approach. Such positional dynamics are relevant for competition in battlefields, politics, and market places.

Keywords: Contests; political stability; war; incumbent advantage (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2008-02-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Working Paper: King of the Hill Positional Dynamics in Contests (2008)
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