Multinationals, Minority Ownership and Tax-Efficient Financing Structures

Dirk Schindler and Guttorm Schjelderup

No 2008/19, Discussion Papers from Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science

Abstract: We model how multinationals structure their borrowing and lending transactions and find that affiliates in high-tax countries have higher internal and overall debt ratios and lower rental rates of physical capital than comparable domestic firms. We also show that affiliates with minority owners have less debt than wholly owned affiliates.

Keywords: Multinational enterprises; tax-efficient financing structures; minority ownership (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F23 H25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2008-10-17
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/11250/163948 (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://hdl.handle.net/11250/163948 [302 Found]--> https://www.unit.no/brage-denne-lenken-er-ikke-lenger-gyldig [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://sikt.no/brage-denne-lenken-er-ikke-lenger-gyldig)

Related works:
Working Paper: Multinationals, Minority Ownership and Tax-Efficient Financing Structures (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:nhhfms:2008_019

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers from Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science NHH, Department of Business and Management Science, Helleveien 30, N-5045 Bergen, Norway. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Stein Fossen ().