Decentralized Pricing and the equivalence between Nash and Walrasian equilibrium
Antoine Mandel and
Herbert Gintis
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Abstract:
We introduce, in the standard exchange economy model, market games in which agents use private prices as strategies. We give conditions on the game form that ensure that the only strict Nash equilibria of the game are the competitive equilibria of the underlying economy. This equivalence result has two main corollaries. First, it adds to the evidence that competitive equilibria can be strategically stable even in small economies. Second, it implies that competitive equilibria have good local stability properties under a large class of evolutionary learning dynamics.
Keywords: Computational economics; Evolutionary game theory; Market games; Stability; General equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-03-01
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01296646v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)
Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2016, 63, pp.84-92. ⟨10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.12.008⟩
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Journal Article: Decentralized Pricing and the equivalence between Nash and Walrasian equilibrium (2016)
Working Paper: Decentralized Pricing and the equivalence between Nash and Walrasian equilibrium (2016)
Working Paper: Decentralized Pricing and the equivalence between Nash and Walrasian equilibrium (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01296646
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.12.008
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