Optimal Redistributive Taxation in a Search Equilibrium Model

Mathias Hungerbuehler, Etienne Lehmann (), Alexis Parmentier () and Bruno Van der Linden
Additional contact information
Mathias Hungerbuehler: UNamur - Université de Namur [Namur]
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Mathias Hungerbühler ()

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: This paper characterizes optimal non-linear income taxation in an economy with a continuum of unobservable productivity levels and endogenous involuntary unemployment due to frictions in the labour markets. Redistributive taxation distorts labour demand and wages. Compared to their efficient values, gross wages, unemployment, and participation are lower. Average tax rates are increasing. Marginal tax rates are positive, even at the top. Finally, numerical simulations suggest that redistribution is much more important in our setting than in a comparable Mirrlees-type setting.

Keywords: unemployment; wage bargaining; matching; optimal income taxation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-07
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.univ-reunion.fr/hal-01248161
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (76)

Published in Review of Economic Studies, 2006, 73 (3), pp.743-767. ⟨10.1111/j.1467-937X.2006.00394.x⟩

Downloads: (external link)
https://hal.univ-reunion.fr/hal-01248161/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Optimal Redistributive Taxation in a Search Equilibrium Model (2006)
Working Paper: Optimal Redistributive Taxation in a Search Equilibrium Model (2005)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01248161

DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2006.00394.x

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().