[go: up one dir, main page]
More Web Proxy on the site http://driver.im/
  EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Political Partisanship and Financial Reforms in Advanced Countries

Thibault Darcillon

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: Applying regressions on a sample of 18 OECD countries from 1970 to 2009 using new indicators, we find that right-wing governments liberalize more the financial sector that left-wing governments. We show that if a left-wing government accepts to liberalize the financial sector, an increase of social security expenditures can facilitate the adoption of a new legislation in the financial sector. To estimate the impact of the government partisan affiliation on the corporate governance legislation, we use a probit model and a conditional Cox model in gap time in 16 OECD over the 1970-2009 period. Statistically, we find that right-wing governments enhance more pro-shareholder policies.

Keywords: Effet partisan; libéralisation financière; gouvernance d'entreprise; changement institutionnel.; Political Partisanship; financial liberalization; corporate governance; institutional change. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00639840v1
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Published in 2011

Downloads: (external link)
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00639840v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Political Partisanship and Financial Reforms in Advanced Countries (2011) Downloads
Working Paper: Political Partisanship and Financial Reforms in Advanced Countries (2011) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00639840

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().

 
Page updated 2024-12-24
Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00639840