Public Information as a Source of Disagreement

Laurent Bouton, Aniol Llorente-Saguer (), Antonin Macé, Adam Meirowitz (), Shaoting Pi () and Dimitrios Xefteris
Additional contact information
Laurent Bouton: GU - Georgetown University [Washington], NBER - National Bureau of Economic Research [New York] - NBER - The National Bureau of Economic Research, CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research
Aniol Llorente-Saguer: QMUL - Queen Mary University of London, CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research
Adam Meirowitz: Yale University [New Haven]
Shaoting Pi: ISU - Iowa State University

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Abstract: This paper studies how Bayesian agents' beliefs about the value of a random variable respond to the disclosure of public information. We show that the release of public information can increase disagreement about the value of that variable. This occurs when the public information does not pertain directly to the value of the variable, but instead pertains to factors influencing its value. This result holds for a range of assumptions about the information structure including cases where the public announcements involve aggregating private information held by the agents.

Keywords: Public events; Agent voting; Information aggregation; Disagreement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-07
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-04075483v2
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Working Paper: Public Information as a Source of Disagreement (2024)
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