Revenue Efficiency and Change of Control: The Case of Bankruptcy

Leonardo Felli and Francesca Cornelli

FMG Discussion Papers from Financial Markets Group

Abstract: The restructing of a bankrupt company often entails a change of control. By efficiency of a bankruptcy procedure it is usually meant that the control is allocated into the hands of those who can maximise its value. In this paper we focus instead on how to allocate control with a procedure that allows creditors to maximise their returns. The conclusion is that creditors should be allowed to retain a fraction of the shares of the company.

Date: 1998-08
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.lse.ac.uk/fmg/workingPapers/discussionPapers/fmg_pdfs/dp300.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Revenue Efficiency and Change of Control: The Case of Bankruptcy (1998)
Working Paper: Revenue Efficiency and Change of Control: The Case of Bankruptcy
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fmg:fmgdps:dp300

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in FMG Discussion Papers from Financial Markets Group
Bibliographic data for series maintained by The FMG Administration ().