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Subsidizing Startups under Imperfect Information

Davide Melcangi and Javier Turen

No 995, Staff Reports from Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Abstract: We study the early stages of firm creation under imperfect information. Because startups make error-prone decisions due to rational inattention, the model generates both inefficient entry and labor misallocation. We show that information frictions alter the effects of lump-sum transfers to startups: the total employment gain is amplified due to an unintended increase in inefficient entry, most entrants hire fewer workers, and misallocation goes up. The transfer makes low-size, previously dominated actions profitable, affecting the entire endogenous learning problem and making even productive startups lean toward more conservative hiring. We show that this novel information channel works against well-known mechanisms (for example, financial frictions) and also dampens the effects of alternative policies such as wage subsidies.

Keywords: startups; rational inattention; firm subsidy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 E60 H25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41
Date: 2021-12-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cwa, nep-ent, nep-mac and nep-mic
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Journal Article: Subsidizing startups under imperfect information (2023) Downloads
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