The Illusion of School Choice: Empirical Evidence from Barcelona

Caterina Calsamiglia and Maia G∏ell

No eee2014-15, Studies on the Spanish Economy from FEDEA

Abstract: The Boston mechanism is a school allocation procedure that is widely used around the world. To resolve overdemands, priority is often given to families who live in the neighborhood school. We note that such priorities define some schools as being safer. We exploit an unexpected change in the definition of neighborhood in Barcelona to show that when allowing school choice under the BM with priorities: (1) the resulting allocation is not very different from a neighborhood-based assignment, and (2) important inequalities emerge beyond parents' naivete found in the literature.

Date: 2014-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ure
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Related works:
Working Paper: The Illusion of School Choice: Empirical Evidence from Barcelona (2014)
Working Paper: The Illusion of School Choice: Empirical Evidence from Barcelona (2014)
Working Paper: The Illusion of School Choice: Empirical Evidence from Barcelona (2014)
Working Paper: The Illusion of School Choice: Empirical Evidence from Barcelona (2014)
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