Agency problems in stock market‐driven acquisitions

Scott Fung, Hoje Jo and Shih‐Chuan Tsai

Review of Accounting and Finance, 2009, vol. 8, issue 4, 388-430

Abstract: Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to examine the ways in which stock market valuation and managerial incentives jointly affect merger and acquisition (M&A) decisions and post‐M&A performance, and to provide new evidence on the agency implications where such acquisitions are driven by the stock market. Design/methodology/approach - Utilizing all publicly‐traded US firms in the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ during the period from 1992 to 2005 (excluding financial and utility firms), obtained from COMPUSTAT, CRSP, I/B/E/S, and the M&A database provided by SDC Platinum, this paper adopts a two‐stage approach: the first stage, predicts the probability of an M&A based on the market valuation variables; the second stage, regresses the post‐M&A firm performance on the predicted probability of a merger or acquisition from the first stage and other control variables. Findings - Market valuation has a significant influence on corporate acquisition decisions, particularly for those firms whose compensation packages include less managerial equity ownership, more executive stock options and no long‐term incentive plans, and in those firms where CEOs are serving on the board of directors. The value‐destroying acquisitions made by these types of managers are likely to be financed using the firms' stocks, executed with high premiums and undertaken during periods of high market valuation. Originality/value - The main finding suggests that market‐driven acquisitions could be value destroying when managers engage in opportunistic acquisitions for reasons of self‐interest. Managerial myopia, overconfidence, misaligned incentives, empire‐building motives and poor corporate governance can all exacerbate the agency problem of market‐driven acquisitions.

Keywords: Acquisitions and mergers; Market value; Compensation; United States of America (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eme:rafpps:v:8:y:2009:i:4:p:388-430

DOI: 10.1108/14757700911006958

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