Auctioning conservation contracts in the presence of externalities
Raphael Calel
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library
Abstract:
Current models of conservation auctions do not permit for the presence of environmental externalities and synergies between bidders. Yet, conservation auctions are usually set up for the very purpose of addressing problems associated with environmental externalities. Clearly, our models do not tell the whole story, and they consequently fail to identify waste and inefficiency in these auctions. Our paper shows how externalities between bidders can be incorporated into our models of conservation auctions, and uses this framework to investigate the cost-efficiency of the uniform-price auction when neighbours can bid jointly. Allowing neighbours to bid jointly allows them to internalise these externalities, but also reduces the competitiveness of the auction. The net effect on cost-efficiency is ambiguous, so we show how simulation can be used to determine in what circumstances joint bidding can be expected to reduce the payments needed to secure a given amount of ecosystem services.
Keywords: externalities; joint bidding; multi-unit auctions; payments for ecosystem services (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 H23 Q19 Q57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2010-08
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
Downloads: (external link)
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/37395/ Open access version. (application/pdf)
Related works:
Working Paper: Auctioning conservation contracts in thepresence of externalities (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:37395
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