Dual-class firms, M&As and SOX

Lamia Chourou, Ashrafee T. Hossain and Lawrence Kryzanowski

The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 2019, vol. 71, issue C, 176-187

Abstract: By analyzing a large sample of M&A deals undertaken by domestic dual-class acquirers in the United States (1996–2009), this study finds that deals were more value-enhancing for acquiring firm shareholders, both in the short- and long-term, in the aftermath of the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). This study provides evidence that the transparency measures mandated by SOX had positive and tangible incremental benefits evidenced by enhanced performance by supposedly ‘poorly governed’ dual-class acquirers relative to their single-class counterparts.

Keywords: Dual-class firms; Transparency; Corporate governance; Mergers and acquisitions; SOX (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G14 G30 G34 G38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:quaeco:v:71:y:2019:i:c:p:176-187

DOI: 10.1016/j.qref.2018.08.005

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