A sufficient condition for two-person ex post implementation in a general environment

Yoshihiro Ohashi

Mathematical Social Sciences, 2014, vol. 69, issue C, 63-68

Abstract: This paper establishes sufficient conditions for two-person ex post implementation of a social choice set in a general environment. A single social choice function is ex post implementable if it satisfies ex post incentive compatibility (EPIC) and ex post monotonicity no veto (EMNV) conditions. A general social choice set is ex post implementable if it satisfies another condition, intersection property (IP), in addition to the above.

Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:69:y:2014:i:c:p:63-68

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2014.02.002

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