Executive compensation and internal capital market efficiency
Sudip Datta,
Ranjan D'Mello and
Mai Iskandar-Datta
Journal of Financial Intermediation, 2009, vol. 18, issue 2, 242-258
Abstract:
We document that chief executive officer (CEO) incentive compensation plays an important role in determining internal capital market (ICM) allocation efficiency. Our results suggest that CEO equity-based compensation can be effective in ameliorating inefficiencies in internal capital allocation decisions. We find that while stock grants play an important role in motivating CEOs to make more efficient internal capital allocation decisions, there is surprisingly no discernible influence of stock options. Our analysis supports the view that private benefits derived by managers are increasing in internal capital misallocation. We also document a strong positive link between CEO incentive compensation and excess value of diversified firms suggesting that the diversification discount can be ameliorated with CEO incentive compensation. The study contributes to the ICM literature and the literature on conglomerate diversification discount.
Keywords: Internal; capital; markets; Managerial; compensation; Capital; allocation; decision (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jfinin:v:18:y:2009:i:2:p:242-258
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