The consequences of endogenizing information for the performance of a sequential decision procedure

Otto Swank () and Bauke Visser

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2008, vol. 65, issue 3-4, 667-681

Abstract: We analyse the implications of endogenizing information collection and reputational concerns for the performance of a sequential decision structure. In this model, two agents decide in a sequence whether to implement a public project. The cost of gathering information is private. We derive two results. First, endogenizing information replaces the herding problem with a free-rider problem. Second, endogenizing information aggravates the distortionary effect of reputational concerns.

Date: 2008
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167-2681(06)00191-0
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:65:y:2008:i:3-4:p:667-681

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization is currently edited by Houser, D. and Puzzello, D.

More articles in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().