Real-time monitoring in a public-goods game

Simin He and Xun Zhu

Games and Economic Behavior, 2023, vol. 142, issue C, 454-479

Abstract: We investigate a novel continuous-time mechanism in a public-goods game. In this game, a clock ensures that the contributions regularly increase within a fixed period for each player. The players can choose when to stop their contributions from increasing while others observe their actions in real time. We demonstrate, theoretically and experimentally, that such a mechanism effectively improves contributions. Three critical factors could cause improvement: announcements, incremental commitments, and the clock. We further decompose these factors and find that while announcements alone are ineffective, introducing incremental commitments and the clock can significantly improve contributions.

Keywords: Public goods; Continuous time; Incremental commitments; Announcements (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:142:y:2023:i:c:p:454-479

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.08.017

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