Honesty in the city

Martin Dufwenberg, Paul Feldman, Maroš Servátka, Jorge Tarrasó and Radovan Vadovič

Games and Economic Behavior, 2023, vol. 139, issue C, 15-25

Abstract: Lab evidence on trust games involves more cooperation than conventional economic theory predicts. We explore whether this pattern extends to a field setting where we are able to control for (lack of) repeat-play and reputation: the taxi market in Mexico City. We find a remarkably high degree of trustworthiness, even with price-haggling which was predicted to reduce trustworthiness.

Keywords: Trustworthiness; Honesty; Reciprocity; Field experiment; Haggling; Taxis; Mexico City (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C90 C93 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Working Paper: Honesty in the City (2022)
Working Paper: Honesty in the city (2022)
Working Paper: Honesty in the City (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:139:y:2023:i:c:p:15-25

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.01.007

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