Delegation and commitment in durable goods monopolies

Tarek Coury () and Vladimir Petkov ()

Games and Economic Behavior, 2008, vol. 63, issue 1, 41-55

Abstract: This paper studies a simultaneous-move infinite-horizon delegation game in which the principal of a durable goods monopoly entrusts pricing decisions to a manager who enjoys consuming her monetary rewards but dislikes production effort. The delegation contract allows for continual interference with managerial incentives: in each period the principal rewards the manager according to her performance. We show that when the cost of delegation is low relative to profits, the principal can attain the precommitment price plan in a perfect rational expectations equilibrium. The paper analyzes the robustness of this result under alternative specifications of timing and objectives. We also provide a numerical characterization of the equilibrium strategies for the case of linear-quadratic payoffs.

Date: 2008
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Working Paper: Delegation and Commitment in Durable Goods Monopolies (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:63:y:2008:i:1:p:41-55

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