Social preferences and voting on reform: An experimental study

Fabian Paetzel, Rupert Sausgruber and Stefan Traub ()

European Economic Review, 2014, vol. 70, issue C, 36-55

Abstract: Debating over efficiency-enhancing but inequality-increasing reforms accounts for the routine business of democratic institutions. Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) hold that anti-reform bias can be attributed to individual-specific uncertainty regarding the distribution of gains and losses resulting from a reform. In this paper, we experimentally demonstrate that anti-reform bias arising from uncertainty is mitigated by social preferences. We show that, paradoxically, many who stand to lose from reforms vote in favor because they value efficiency, while many who will potentially gain from reforms oppose them due to inequality aversion.

Keywords: Political economy of reform; Status quo bias; Social preferences; Voting; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D72 D80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Working Paper: Social Preferences and Voting on Reform: An Experimental Study (2014)
Working Paper: Social Preferences and Voting on Reform: An Experimental Study (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:70:y:2014:i:c:p:36-55

DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2014.03.010

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