An incentive compatible scoring rule for ordinal judgments of expected utility maximizers

Johannes G. Jaspersen

Economics Letters, 2013, vol. 120, issue 2, 245-248

Abstract: This note introduces a scoring rule for ordinal likelihood judgments based on the linear scoring rule. If the ordinal judgments are strict, the scoring rule is incentive compatible for expected utility maximizers as long utility is increasing in wealth. When allowing for non-strict judgments, the scoring rule is no longer incentive compatible for all expected utility maximizers, but still incentive compatible for expected value maximizers. In both cases the scoring rule fulfills the Relevance Principle and is thus simple to implement experimentally.

Keywords: Scoring rules; Expected utility maximization; Ordinal information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176513002206
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:120:y:2013:i:2:p:245-248

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.04.042

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().