Fundamentalists vs. chartists: Learning and predictor choice dynamics

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2011, vol. 35, issue 5, 776-792

Abstract: In a simple, forward looking univariate model of price determination we investigate the evolution of expectations dynamics in the presence of two types of agents: fundamentalists and chartists. In particular, we combine evolutionary selection among heterogeneous classes of models through predictor choice dynamics based on a logit model, with adaptive learning in the form of parameters updating within each class of rules. We find that, for different parameterizations, it can happen that fundamentalists drive chartists completely out of the market or vice versa, and also that heterogeneous equilibria in which fundamentalists and chartists coexist are possible. Interestingly, though, only equilibria in which fundamentalists outperform chartists turn out to be adaptively learnable by agents.

Keywords: Heterogeneity; Expectations; Predictor; choice; Learning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165-1889(11)00013-3
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Fundamentalists vs. chartists: Learning and predictor choice dynamics (2011)
Working Paper: Fundamentalists vs. chartists: learning and predictor choice dynamics (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:35:y:2011:i:5:p:776-792

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control is currently edited by J. Bullard, C. Chiarella, H. Dawid, C. H. Hommes, P. Klein and C. Otrok

More articles in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().