Sequential All-Pay Auctions with Head Starts

Aner Sela and Ella Segev

No 8183, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We study a sequential all-pay auction where heterogeneous contestants are privately informed about a parameter (ability) that affects their cost of effort. In the case of two contestants, contestant 1 (the first mover) makes an effort in the first period, while contestant 2 (the second mover) observes the effort of contestant 1 and then makes an effort in the second period. Contestant 2 wins the contest if his effort is larger than or equal to the effort of contestant 1; otherwise, contestant 1 wins. This model is then generalized to any number of contestants where in each period of the contest, 1 /

Keywords: All-pay auctions; Head starts; Sequential contests (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 O31 O32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Journal Article: Sequential all-pay auctions with head starts (2014)
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