Managerial Duties and Managerial Biases

Ulrike M. Malmendier, Vincenzo Pezone and Hui Zheng

No 14929, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Traits and biases of CEOs are known to significantly affect corporate outcomes. However, analyzing individual managers in isolation can result in misattribution. Our analysis focuses on the role of CEO and CFO overconfidence in financing decisions. We show that, when considered jointly, the distorted beliefs of the CFO, rather than the CEO, dominate in generating pecking-order financing distortions. CEO overconfidence still matters indirectly for financing as the CEO's (and not CFO's) type determines investors' assessment of default risk and the resulting financing conditions. Moreover, overconfident CEOs tend to hire overconfident CFOs whenever given the opportunity, generating a multiplier effect.

Date: 2020-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn, nep-cwa and nep-hrm
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