Busted! Now What? Effects of Cartel Enforcement on Firm Value and Corporate Policies

Massimo Massa, Aileen Dong and Alminas Zaldokas

No 11470, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: In a cross-country study we look at the staggered passage of national leniency laws over 1990-2012. We show that these laws lead to more convictions of cartels, and generally increase the costs of collusion by reducing the average gross margins of the affected firms. We further examine how changing costs of collusion shape firm boundaries and show that firms reorganize their activities by engaging in more horizontal acquisitions, both in the roles as the acquirer and the target. These acquisitions tend to be associated with higher announcement returns. We find little evidence of the increase in strategic alliances or greenfield investments.

Keywords: Cartels; Leniency laws; Collusion; Firm boundaries; M&a (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D22 D43 G34 G38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com and nep-law
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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