Leniency programs for multimarket firms: The effect of Amnesty Plus on cartel formation

Yassine Lefouili and Catherine Roux

No 2010021, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: We examine the effect of the Amnesty Plus policy on the incentives of firms to engage in cartel activities. Amnesty Plus is aimed at attracting amnesty applications by encouraging firms, convicted in one market, to report their collusive agreements in other markets. It has been vigorously advertised that Amnesty Plus weakens cartel stability. We show to the contrary that Amnesty Plus may not have this desirable effect, and, if improperly designed, may even stabilize a cartel. We suggest a simple discount-setting rule to avoid this anticompetitive effect.

Keywords: Amnesty Plus; Leniency program; multimarket contact; antitrust policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 K42 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-05-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind, nep-law and nep-reg
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Leniency programs for multimarket firms: The effect of Amnesty Plus on cartel formation (2012)
Working Paper: Leniency Programs for Multimarket Firms: The Effect of Amnesty Plus on Cartel Formation (2008)
Working Paper: Leniency Programs for Multimarket Firms: The Effect of Amnesty Plus on Cartel Formation (2008)
Working Paper: Leniency Programs for Multimarket Firms: The Effect of Amnesty Plus on Cartel Formation (2008)
Working Paper: Leniency Programs for Multimarket Firms: The Effect of Amnesty Plus on Cartel Formation (2008)
Working Paper: Leniency Programs for Multimarket Firms: The Effect of Amnesty Plus on Cartel Formation (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2010021

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