Trade Liberalization and the Adoption of Antidumping Laws in Developing Countries

Revista Equidad y Desarrollo, 2013, No 13160

Abstract: I propose a theoretical model to explain the heterogeneity observed in the adoption of antidumping laws by small developing countries in an environment of multilateral tariff reduction. The analysis is based on a three-stage game of trade policy determination with imperfect competition in differentiated products where the potential lobby for protection is reflected in the government’s objective function and where tariffs may be bound due to multilateral trade agreements. This framework implies that the implementation of this administrative protection device is the government’s best response when multilateral bound tariffs reach a sufficiently low threshold. The heterogeneity in the adoption decision is explained by the relative size of the domestic market, the degree of product differentiation and political economy motives. Relatively large economies, highly competitive domestic markets, and countries with high domestic lobbying pressure for protection enact antidumping legislation sooner.

Keywords: Optimal trade policy; intra-industry trade; product differentiation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F12 F13 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.19052/ed.2627

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:col:000452:013160

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Revista Equidad y Desarrollo from Universidad de la Salle Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Adriana Otálora Buitrago ().