CEO Compensation

Carola Frydman and Dirk Jenter

No 3277, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This paper surveys the recent literature on CEO compensation. The rapid rise in CEO pay over the past 30 years has sparked an intense debate about the nature of the pay-setting process. Many view the high level of CEO compensation as the result of powerful managers setting their own pay. Others interpret high pay as the result of optimal contracting in a competitive market for managerial talent. We describe and discuss the empirical evidence on the evolution of CEO pay and on the relationship between pay and firm performance since the 1930s. Our review suggests that both managerial power and competitive market forces are important determinants of CEO pay, but that neither approach is fully consistent with the available evidence. We briefly discuss promising directions for future research.

Keywords: executive compensation; managerial incentives; incentive compensation; equity compensation; option compensation; corporate governance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D20 G30 J30 J31 J33 J41 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (66)

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Journal Article: CEO Compensation (2010)
Working Paper: CEO Compensation (2010)
Working Paper: CEO Compensation (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3277

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