The Dynastic Transmission of Power, Exit Options and the Coevolution of Rent-Seeking Elites

Arthur Silve, Thierry Verdier and Thierry Verdier
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Thierry A. Verdier

No 10410, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We introduce a dynamic model that investigates the persistence and evolution of elite-dominated societies, where inherited political capital determines one’s social standing. Our analysis highlights the critical role of the distribution of exit options in the evolution of political inclusiveness across generations. An elite comparatively more mobile than the masses generally entrenches a politically stratified society, whereas a more widespread distribution of exit options can encourage inclusiveness. Under certain conditions differential mobility may still induce political inclusiveness across generations. Exit options across different political entities lead to a joint evolution of local power structures.

Keywords: political dynasties; elite dynamics; exit options; rent-seeking; political spillovers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 F42 H26 P16 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-pol and nep-soc
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Working Paper: The Dynastic Transmission of Power, Exit Options and the Coevolution of Rent-seeking Elites (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_10410

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