Do IMF and World Bank Influence Voting in the UN General Assembly?

No 1724, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Using panel data for 188 countries over the period 1970-2002 this paper empirically analyzes the influence of the IMF and the World Bank on voting patterns in the UN General Assembly. Countries receiving adjustment programs and larger non-concessional loans from the World Bank vote more frequently in line with the average G7 country. The same is true for countries obtaining non-concessional IMF programs. Regarding voting coincidence with the US, World Bank (concessional and non-concessional) loans have a significant impact, while the IMF has not. These results are robust to the inclusion of control variables and method of estimation.

Keywords: IMF; World Bank; UN General Assembly; voting; aid (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (48)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Do the IMF and the World Bank influence voting in the UN General Assembly? (2012)
Working Paper: Do IMF and World Bank influence voting in the UN general assembly? (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1724

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