Innovation and Regulation in the Pesticide Industry

Michael Ollinger and Jorge Fernandez-Cornejo

Working Papers from U.S. Census Bureau, Center for Economic Studies

Abstract: This paper examines the hypothesis that regulation negatively affects pesticide innovation, causes pesticide companies to introduce more harmful pesticides, and discourages firms from developing pesticides for minor crop markets. The results confirm that pesticide regulation adversely affects innovation and discourages firms from developing pesticides for minor crop markets. Contrary to the hypothesis, however, regulation encourages firms to develop less toxic pesticides. Estimates suggest that it requires about $29 million in industry expenditures on health and environmental testing to affect the toxicity of one new pesticide.

Keywords: CES; economic; research; micro; data; microdata; chief; economist (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1995-12
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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https://www2.census.gov/ces/wp/1995/CES-WP-95-14.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: INNOVATION AND REGULATION IN THE PESTICIDE INDUSTRY (1998)
Journal Article: Innovation and Regulation in the Pesticide Industry (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cen:wpaper:95-14

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