On the Efficiency of Partial Information in Elections

No 234, Carlo Alberto Notebooks from Collegio Carlo Alberto

Abstract: We study the relation between the electorate's information about candidates' policy platforms during an election, and the subsequent provision of inefficient local public goods (pork) by the winning candidate. More information does not lead to better outcomes. We show that the efficient outcome in which no candidate proposes to provide any inefficient good is sustained in equilibrium only if voters are not well informed. If the electorate is well informed, electoral competition leads candidates to provide inefficient pork in all equilibria. We show that this result is robust even if candidates care about efficiency.

Keywords: Elections; information; inefficiency; pork; campaigns (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D61 D72 H40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 46 pages
Date: 2011
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cta, nep-mic and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cca:wpaper:234

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