Shaking Up the System: When Populism Disciplines Elite Politicians

Emmanuelle Auriol, Nicolas Bonneton and Mattias Polborn

CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series from University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany

Abstract: This article studies the behavior of rational voters who, although aware of the limitations of populist leaders, consider supporting them strategically. We present a moral hazard model of electoral accountability in which elite politicians are both office- and policy-motivated and face the risk of being replaced by elite or populist candidates. The optimal retention strategy depends on the policy implemented by the incumbent in the previous period and its perceived success, and involves differentiated punishment for a failing incumbent. Rational voters only vote for populists when the chosen policy is both perceived as failure and as benefiting the elites. This challenges the simplistic view of the populist vote as mere frustration with the elite.

Pages: 51
Date: 2023-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-mic and nep-pol
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Working Paper: Shaking Up the System: When Populism Disciplines Elite Politicians (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2023_473

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