R&D for green technologies in a dynamic oligopoly: Schumpeter, Arrow and inverted-U s

Gustav Feichtinger, Luca Lambertini (), G. Leitmann and S. Wrzaczek

Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna

Abstract: We extend a well known differential oligopoly game to encompass the possibility for production to generate a negative environmental externality, regulated through Pigouvian taxation and price caps. We show that, if the price cap is set so as to fix the tolerable maximum amount of emissions, the resulting equilibrium investment in green R&D is indeed concave in the structure of the industry. Our analysis appears to indicate that inverted-U-shaped investment curves are generated by regulatory measures instead of being a natural feature of firms decisions.

JEL-codes: C73 L13 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ene, nep-env, nep-ino and nep-res
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://amsacta.unibo.it/3981/1/WP929.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: R&D for green technologies in a dynamic oligopoly: Schumpeter, arrow and inverted-U’s (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp929

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna ().