Duality for General TU-games Redefined

Fatma Aslan, Papatya Duman and Walter Trockel
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Fatma Aslan: Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University
Papatya Duman: Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University
Walter Trockel: Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

No 620, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers from Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

Abstract: We criticize some conceptual weaknesses in the recent literature on coalitional TUgames and propose, based on our critics, a new definition of dual TU-games that coincides with the one in the literature on the class of super-additive games. We justify our new definition in four alternative ways: 1. Via an adequate definition of efficient payoff vectors. 2. Via a modification of the Bondareva-Shapley duality. 3. Via an explicit consideration of \coalition building". 4. Via associating general TU-games to coalition-production economies. Rather than imputations, we base our analysis on a modification of aspirations.

Keywords: TU-games; duality; core; c{Core; cohesive games; complete game efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35
Date: 2019-07-23
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/download/2936652/2936653 First Version, 2019 (application/pdf)

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Working Paper: Duality for General TU-games Redefined (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bie:wpaper:620

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