On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules

Claus-Jochen Haake () and Walter Trockel

No 393, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers from Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University

Abstract: Howard (1992) argues that the Nash bargaining solution is not Nash implementable, as it does not satisfy Maskin monotonicity. His arguments can be extended to other bargaining solutions as well. However, by defining a social choice correspondence that is based on the solution rather than on its realizations, one can overcome this shortcoming. We even show that such correspondences satisfy a stronger version of monotonicity that is even sufficient for Nash implementability.

Keywords: Bargaining games; Implementation; Mechanism; Maskin monotonicity; Nash program; Social choice rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-08-15
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/download/2315668/2319831 First Version, 2007 (application/pdf)

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Journal Article: On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules (2010)
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