Do Incompetent Politicians Breed Populist Voters? Evidence from Italian Municipalities

Federico Boffa, Vincenzo Mollisi and Giacomo Ponzetto

No 1388, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: Poor performance by the established political class can drive voters towards anti-establishment outsiders. Is the ineffectiveness of incumbent politicians an important driver of the recent rise of populist parties? We provide an empirical test exploiting a sharp discontinuity in the wage of local politicians as a function of population in Italian municipalities. We find that the more skilled local politicians and more effective local government in municipalities above the threshold cause a significant drop in voter support for the populist Five-Star Movement in regional and national elections. Support for incumbent governing parties increases instead.

Keywords: populism; government efficiency; politician quality; political agency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D73 H70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eur, nep-pol and nep-ure
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Do Incompetent Politicians Breed Populist Voters? Evidence from Italian Municipalities (2023)
Working Paper: Do incompetent politicians breed populist voters? Evidence from Italian municipalities (2023)
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