Constructive Decision Theory
Lawrence Blume,
David Easley and
Joseph Halpern ()
Papers from arXiv.org
Abstract:
In most contemporary approaches to decision making, a decision problem is described by a sets of states and set of outcomes, and a rich set of acts, which are functions from states to outcomes over which the decision maker (DM) has preferences. Most interesting decision problems, however, do not come with a state space and an outcome space. Indeed, in complex problems it is often far from clear what the state and outcome spaces would be. We present an alternative foundation for decision making, in which the primitive objects of choice are syntactic programs. A representation theorem is proved in the spirit of standard representation theorems, showing that if the DM's preference relation on objects of choice satisfies appropriate axioms, then there exist a set S of states, a set O of outcomes, a way of interpreting the objects of choice as functions from S to O, a probability on S, and a utility function on O, such that the DM prefers choice a to choice b if and only if the expected utility of a is higher than that of b. Thus, the state space and outcome space are subjective, just like the probability and utility; they are not part of the description of the problem. In principle, a modeler can test for SEU behavior without having access to states or outcomes. We illustrate the power of our approach by showing that it can capture decision makers who are subject to framing effects.
Date: 2009-06, Revised 2021-07
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Related works:
Journal Article: Constructive decision theory (2021)
Working Paper: Constructive Decision Theory (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:0906.4316
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