Executive Incentives, Import Restrictions, and Competition: Empirical Analysis of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders

No 9889, Working Papers from George Mason University, Mercatus Center

Abstract: In an effort to better understand the political economy and public choice of trade policy, I examine whether and how firms benefit following negative shocks to competition with particular emphasis on the compensation of executives. Industries affected by

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Date: 2019-11-04
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