Economic Perspectives on Corporate Social Responsibility

Markus Kitzmueller and Jay Shimshack
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Markus Kitzmuller

Journal of Economic Literature, 2012, vol. 50, issue 1, 51-84

Abstract: This paper synthesizes the expanding corporate social responsibility (CSR) literature. We define CSR from an economic perspective and develop a CSR taxonomy that connects disparate approaches to the subject. We explore whether CSR should exist and investigate conditions when CSR may produce higher welfare than other public good provision channels. We also explore why CSR does exist. Here, we integrate theoretical predictions with empirical findings from economic and noneconomic sources. We find limited systematic empirical evidence in favor of CSR mechanisms related to induced innovation, moral hazard, shareholder preferences, or labor markets. In contrast, we uncover consistent empirical evidence in favor of CSR mechanisms related to consumer markets, private politics, and public politics. (JEL D21, L21, M14)

JEL-codes: D21 L21 M14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
Note: DOI: 10.1257/jel.50.1.51
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (429)

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