Ten Little Treasures of Game Theory and Ten Intuitive Contradictions

American Economic Review, 2001, vol. 91, issue 5, 1402-1422

Abstract: This paper reports laboratory data for games that are played only once. These games span the standard categories: static and dynamic games with complete and incomplete information. For each game, the treasure is a treatment in which behavior conforms nicely to predictions of the Nash equilibrium or relevant refinement. In each case, however, a change in the payoff structure produces a large inconsistency between theoretical predictions and observed behavior. These contradictions are generally consistent with simple intuition based on the interaction of payoff asymmetries and noisy introspection about others' decisions.

JEL-codes: C70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.91.5.1402
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (282)

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Working Paper: Ten Little Treasures of Game Theory and Ten Intuitive Contradictions (2004)
Working Paper: Ten Little Treasures of Game Theory and Ten Intuitive Contradictions (2000)
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