A Theory of Political Transitions

American Economic Review, 2001, vol. 91, issue 4, 938-963

Abstract: We develop a theory of political transitions inspired by the experiences of Western Europe and Latin America. Nondemocratic societies are controlled by a rich elite. The initially disenfranchised poor can contest power by threatening revolution, especially when the opportunity cost is low, for example, during recessions. The threat of revolution may force the elite to democratize. Democracy may not consolidate because it is redistributive, and so gives the elite an incentive to mount a coup. Highly unequal societies are less likely to consolidate democracy, and may end up oscillating between regimes and suffer substantial fiscal volatility.

JEL-codes: D31 D74 O17 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.91.4.938
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (609)

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Related works:
Working Paper: A Theory of Political Transitions (1999)
Working Paper: A Theory of Political Transitions (1999)
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