Using Field Experiments to Test Equivalence between Auction Formats: Magic on the Internet

American Economic Review, 1999, vol. 89, issue 5, 1063-1080

Abstract: William Vickrey's predicted equivalences between first-price sealed-bid and Dutch auctions, and between second-price sealed-bid and English auctions, are tested using field experiments that auctioned off collectible trading cards over the Internet. The results indicate that the Dutch auction produces 30-percent higher revenues than the first-price auction format, a violation of the theoretical prediction and a reversal of previous laboratory results, and that the English and second-price formats produce roughly equivalent revenues.

JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.89.5.1063
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (183)

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