Optimal Tax Administration

No 22408, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper sets out a framework for analyzing optimal interventions by a tax administration, one that parallels and can be closely integrated with established frameworks for thinking about optimal tax policy. At its heart is a summary measure of the impact of administrative interventions—the “enforcement elasticity of tax revenue”—that is a sufficient statistic for the behavioral response to such interventions, much as the elasticity of taxable income serves as a sufficient statistic for the response to tax rates. Amongst the applications are characterizations of the optimal balance between policy and administrative measures, and of the optimal compliance gap.

JEL-codes: H21 H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-iue, nep-pbe and nep-pub
Note: PE
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published as Michael Keen & Joel Slemrod, 2017. "Optimal Tax Administration," IMF Working Papers, vol 17(8).
Published as Keen, Michael & Slemrod, Joel, 2017. "Optimal tax administration," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 133-142.

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