[go: up one dir, main page]
More Web Proxy on the site http://driver.im/
  EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

A Simple Model of Optimal Hate Crime Legislation

Li Gan (), Roberton Williams and Thomas Wiseman

No 10463, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We present a simple model of the effects of hate crime legislation. It shows that even if the direct harm to victims of hate crime is the same as for other crimes, because of other differences in the effects it may still be optimal to exert more law-enforcement effort to deter or prevent hate crime. These differences also have previously unrecognized effects on the optimal level of effort by potential hate crime victims to avoid being victimized, thus affecting the efficiency of government policies that encourage or discourage such effort. We discuss the implications of these results for optimal hate-crime policy, as well as for policy toward other similar crimes, such as terrorism.

JEL-codes: K14 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
Note: PE
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published as Li Gan & Roberton C. Williams Iii & Thomas Wiseman, 2011. "A Simple Model Of Optimal Hate Crime Legislation," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 49(3), pages 674-684, 07.

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w10463.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: A SIMPLE MODEL OF OPTIMAL HATE CRIME LEGISLATION (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10463

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w10463

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().

 
Page updated 2024-12-28
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10463