Effort and Redistribution: Better Cousins Than One Might Have Thought
Claudia Buch and
Christoph Engel
No 2012_10, Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods from Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Abstract:
In this paper, we analyze the link between effort and preferences for redistribution. If individ-uals hold standard preferences, those with higher ability exert more effort. Higher effort leads to a higher income. Individuals with a higher income oppose redistribution. Yet, under non-standard preferences, the link between effort and redistribution is not clear-cut. If aversion to inequity is sufficiently strong, even individuals with high ability may support redistribution. In a lab experiment, we indeed find that participants with higher ability are willing to help the needy if earning income becomes more difficult for everybody. To check whether this finding is externally valid, we use data from the World Value Survey. We do not find a significant positive effect of preferences for effort on preferences for redistribution, but we also do not find the significant negative effect predicted by standard theory. Also, in the field, those who have to pay for redistribution are not more likely to be opposed than the recipients.
Keywords: Effort; redistribution; ability; experiment; survey data; simultaneous equation model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C31 C91 D31 J28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-04, Revised 2014-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2012_10
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