Can we manage first impressions in cooperation problems? An experiment

Christoph Engel, Sebastian Kube and Michael Kurschilgen

No 2011_05, Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods from Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Abstract: We study how cooperative behavior reacts to selective (favorable or unfavorable) pre-play information about the cooperativeness of other, unrelated groups within an experimental framework that is sufficiently rich for conflicting behavioral norms to emerge. We find that cooperation crucially depends on pre-play information, coinciding with a change in initial beliefs. Over time, behavior within both types of groups becomes increasingly homogeneous, indicating the formation of two rather different social norms, depending on whether pre-play information was favorable or unfavorable. In addition, we find unfavorable information to substantially reduce the effectiveness of peer punishment. For these differences to emerge it is immaterial whether each member or only one member of a four-person group receives the pre-play information.

Keywords: experiment; information; Norms; cooperation; Effectiveness of Sanctions; Expectations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C90 D63 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-03, Revised 2014-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cta, nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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